Open source information and the Military Intelligence Library

Intelligence does not have to be secret to be valuable. Open source intelligence (OSINT) incorporates all types of accessible and unclassified information sources such as books, newspapers, magazines, academic journals, government documents, radio, television, and the Internet.

Emerging Army doctrine states that relevant, accurate, and timely OSINT be provided to commanders at all levels. This is to be accomplished by integrating OSINT into all disciplines and functions by exploiting the Information Age to make OSINT a vital intelligence resource. (1) The research library is a vital link in this effort. This article shows how a new vision and model of library services transformed an under-used and under-funded library into a dynamic intelligence research center focusing on open source (OS) information and value-added services. The U.S. Army Military Intelligence (MI) Library (2) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, illustrates the application of this model, meeting the information needs of the OSINT user and aligning the mission of the research library to the mission of the MI professional. This model moves the MI Library beyond the traditional role of a "place" to house books and other resources to a research center with value-added intelligence services.

The Research Library Mission

Historically, the mission of a research library has been to acquire information (the collection), organize it, preserve it, and make it available. The mission of the Intelligence professional is also to acquire and organize information; however, this information is then analyzed and turned into intelligence. Without getting into a formal doctrine definition, the simplest definition of intelligence can be attributed to Sun Tsu in The Art of War. Know thine enemy." In order to win on the battlefield, intelligence about the enemy is necessary. For the MI Library to support the MI mission today, the library must focus on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Model Guidelines

Providing access to public or OS information has been the focus of libraries for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. Formats have evolved from the clay tablets found in ancient Mesopotamia five thousand years ago to the digital formats of today. (3) Unlike its classified counterparts (i.e., Human Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence), OSINT draws from information found in the open, unclassified world of secondary sources. This is the world of the research library. Because of limited financial resources and the expense of information sources, the following guidelines were important considerations in implementing this new library model at the Army MI Library.

Create Enthusiasm

The model implemented at the MI Library called for a new library marketing and promotion strategy--a new vision of library services. Although one would think that this step should happen after developing the collection, it was important that the vision and marketing strategy happen early in the process. Many of the younger soldiers today do not appreciate libraries and actually want to avoid them. A wonderful OS collection can be built, but if no one uses the library or knows about the resources, then the effort has been in vain. If new soldiers beginning their career in Intelligence develop an enthusiasm and appreciation of the value of OS resources early on, they will utilize these resources even after leaving the schoolhouse.

This model calls for a new library "image" which better meets this generation's learning style. An article in College Student Journal describes this generation very well.

"The world of contemporary students is bombarded with noise, color, and action; even their entertainment is interactive and high tech. This new environment has impacted all levels of education." (4)

This statement is probably even more accurate when describing military students--they thrive on action or they would not have joined the military! The traditional library image is the opposite of what today's generation is accustomed to.

Utilizing this new vision of library services, the MI Library increased attendance by 850 percent by creating a new model of library service and pursuing a new marketing strategy. The vision for the MI Library is focused on a simple strategy: Get the customers to come to the library and create enthusiasm for using open source resources. Lure them in and then hook them! Change the image of the library. Make the library fun, comfortable, and relaxed. Create an environment that is extremely customer-focused.

"If you build it, they will come" does not always work. Some bookstore chains have transformed their image with great success--customers drink a cup of coffee and relax in a comfortable chair while reading books. Why would a profit based business allow customers to read the books without first buying them? Why would they risk having coffee spilled on the materials? The answer is simple: It is a marvelous marketing strategy which brings in the customers.

The marketing strategy of the MI Library includes briefings to all leaders, Open Houses, newsletters, class presentations, and library orientations.

Borrowing from the success of the chain bookstores, free coffee is always available to the customers. With comfortable chairs, music in the background, ice cream and soda machines, Internet access, cable news, and videos, the MI Library attracts around 9000 customers a month. Before implementing the new library model, the MI Library was fortunate to have 50 customers a month. The soldiers may initially come for the coffee and ambience, but judging from the circulation increase of over 500 percent, they soon start reading journals, perusing the military reading lists, and checking out books. Eating is allowed in the library and many customers, utilizing the microwave, eat breakfast and lunch while studying. This library is a place where the customers never hear "Shh!"

Tailor the Collection and Services

Tailor the collection to meet specific needs of the intelligence customer. Go for depth; not breadth. Consistent evaluation, feedback, and needs assessments from the OSINT user are necessary to meet the OS information needs created by such a rapidly changing world. (5) Research libraries, academic libraries, and special libraries are all similar because they do not attempt to collect everything; they do not try to be "all things to all people." The MI Library model proposes that the library focus on the present needs of the customers. What are the specific issues of the customer? What world events are taking place? How do these events impact the MI professional?

Continual needs assessments, surveys and evaluations of the existing services and resources are necessary to meet the needs of the customer. For example, before implementing this model, an evaluation of the present library collection at the MI Library found that 85 percent of the resources were over 25 years old with most focusing on the Cold War era. Based on an assessment of current world events and needs of the MI professional, an aggressive collection development plan was implemented in the areas of the Middle East and the GWOT. The customer surveys also indicated that longer hours were needed at the library since many of the MI customers could not use the library except at night. Library hours were increased by over 40 percent; the MI Library is now open 13 hours per day and on the weekend.

Provide Value-Added Services

Value-added services at the MI Library include an OS Lab with virtual private network (VPN) connectivity to the Open Source Information System (OSIS), instructional briefings in using OSIS, a National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Digital Map Library, and a Computer Center. To have an OS Lab is not enough--the value of OSIS as one-stop shopping for intelligence resources has to be aggressively promoted. Enthusiasm for OSIS is generated through class briefings, instruction, and OSIS demonstrations to include MI Corps leaders.

Almost 50 computers with Internet access are available to the customers, as excellent intelligence related sources are available via the Internet. Many of the students use the computers to write papers, build PowerPoint[TM] presentations, use FormFlow[TM] to fill out paperwork, take distance learning classes, book travel arrangements and take online surveys. A keyboarding tutorial program was even initiated at the library to assist the MI students who were having difficulty in class because typing skills slowed down their ability to write reports. Another popular value-added service is the new multi-media instruction room, with customers reserving this room for meetings, classes, role-playing activities, etc. Value-added services are not just the domain of the physical library, but can also be provided by the digital library through pathfinders (6), portals, and a virtual reference service. The heart of the "brick and mortar" library is its collections. However, the soul of the library is its vision, value-added services and customer focus.

Leverage Sources

Leveraging sources is another guideline in implementing the new library model. Simply put, this means that the MI Library does not purchase anything that can be obtained for free. Commercial databases are very expensive and most small libraries cannot afford the license or access fee. As depicted in Table 1, Army Knowledge Online (AKO) and OSIS licenses commercial databases. The MI Library leverages these sources and does not duplicate effort and expense.

OS information also resides in many databases on the Internet. However, this information cannot be accessed using a search engine like Goggle. This information is considered "invisible" or "deep web" because it resides on a website designed around a database, there are no static pages to index (See Table 2 below). Some commercial vendors often create fee-based databases; with public information. For example, an 89 page thesis from the Naval Postgraduate School can be obtained for free by searching the Science and Technical Information Network (STINET) database. However, this same thesis is offered by several commercial vendors with a price tag of around $25.00.

Exploit Technology

Although a cliche, this is the Information Age. Information, whether it is classified or open source, wins battle and wars. The library of the 21st century has no walls, no set hours, and no geographical constraints. Access issues are as important as ownership issues. The MI Library is both a physical "brick and mortar" library and a virtual library with information available anytime from anyplace. The physical library and the virtual library both develop collections. Traditionally, collection development has been defined as the planned purchase of materials in various formats to match the instructional and research needs of the customers. However, today these collections can be owned, licensed, or just accessed.

The virtual collection is just as important as the physical collection, but has different considerations and constraints. In addition to the library catalog pointing the customer to what is owned by the library, the Internet can be viewed as a gigantic catalog of information sources available worldwide. However, this information has to be tailored to the information needs of the OSINT user. A value-added service to the customers is to sort and filter the myriad of online sources and create pathfinders and porta

When possible, the collection should reflect both physical sources available in the library, as well as accessible digital sources. By exploiting technology, the library catalog of today not only reflects what is owned by the library, but also shows digital sources on the Internet. Even if a source is not owned by the library, it can be cataloged and accessed the same as an owned, physical source. With a click of the mouse, the online source or virtual reference is available.

The physical library collection is important if one lives or works near it. However, for most of us, a virtual library is necessary. The MI soldier transfers frequently to new locations and needs to consistently access sources regardless of geographic location. The MI Library provides a website with online access to the library catalog. A full time virtual model of library reference services is also available (Table 4 below). Collaboration and sharing of files via listserves and knowledge communities are important for the MI professional (Table 5 below).

In conclusion, Intelligence professionals are working in a different environment today. Stephen Mercado in an article in Studies in Intelligence says it best:

"Collecting intelligence these days is at times less a matter of stealing through dark alleys in a foreign land to meet some secret agent than one of surfing the Internet under the fluorescent lights of an office cubicle to find some open source. The world is changing with the advance of commerce and technology. Mouse clicks and online dictionaries today often prove more useful than stylish cloaks and shiny daggers in gathering intelligence required to help analysts and officials understand the world." (7)

This article presents a model that moved the MI Library beyond the traditional role of a place to house books to a dynamic research center with value-added intelligence services and sources, such as an OS Lab. This model includes a new marketing strategy and image for the library which better meets this generation's learning style. By leveraging sources and exploiting technology, the MI Library is an important link in the MI Corps' effort to make OSINT a vital intelligence resource.

Applying G4 Theory to Intelligence Community

Just a few months ago, a team of retired military officers representing three branches of the armed services gave an important presentation at the 16th Annual Army War College Strategy Conference at the Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania.[1] This presentation provided a number of forward thinking suggestions on how to reverse the setbacks the US is currently suffering in Iraq and Afghanistan, including real departures from present Department of Defense (DOD) official lines, such as the over reliance on technology outlined in DOD’s Joint Vision 2020 [2] , and the centralized, compartmented and hierarchical means of dissemination of intelligence and orders. Wilson, Wilcox and Richards state in their presentation that in order to defeat insurgents and terrorists in Iraq and worldwide in the post 9/11 era, we have to “become cellular like them”, “leverage unconventional capabilities”, and “rely on the skill, cunning, experience and intelligence of our front line forces to convert information into intel. . . while it still means something!”[3] These recommendations represent a debate among military thinkers as our armed services attempt to transform themselves into a force capable of defeating the networked, decentralized and transnational enemies we face today. It is part of a revolution in military thought known as The Military Reform Movement. This movement, spearheaded largely by retired and active officers across the services, is challenging the established norms of the military bureaucracy, and is based around two critical pillars: The teachings of legendary strategist John Boyd, and the concept of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW).[4] This movement is changing the way we fight on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and its honest assessment of the enemy we face is invaluable to the Intelligence Community (IC).But as noted by Myke Cole, consultant with the CACI Corporation and a student in the International Security graduate program at the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs,unfortunately, while a lively discussion of 4GW and the need for a low-tech, networked, real-time approach to combating the enemy, heavily reliant on Human Intelligence (HUMINT), seems to be enjoying a great deal of attention in the military intelligence circles, it does not seem to have penetrated the intelligence community at large. A careful examination of these arguments and their possible application to the entire IC is both warranted and overdue. What is Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) and why is it important to the IC? While there is some debate as to how to exactly define 4GW, a widely accepted definition is an “evolved form of insurgency [that] uses all available networks—political, economic, social, military—to convince the enemy’s decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.”[5] This super insurgency “. . . seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined. . . It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ may disappear.”[6] This description, while broad, suggests that the United States has already faced 4GW opponents in Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia and is facing them again today in Iraq and Afghanistan. Other hallmarks of 4GW opponents find resonance in the experiences of our troops and intelligence agents currently engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan [7]: 1.) 4GW opponents are united by a conforming ideology. Mao Tse-Tung, considered the father of 4GW from his development of “People’s War,” wrote “Political mobilization is the most fundamental condition for winning the war.”[8] Where Mao projected political ideology to weld together disparate urban workers, rural peasants, and the Soviet and Chinese schools of Communism, Salafist extremism unites religiously disparate Sunni and Shi’a as well as ethno-culturally disparate Arabs, Turks and Persians in their efforts to combat the interests of the United States. 2.) 4GW actors are stateless, either transnational (international terrorist organizations, drug cartels, etc. . . ) or subnational (Somali clans, ethnic separatist groups within established states). They do not wear uniforms or respect national borders and may not even share a common language. They are defined only by their stated objective. 3.) 4GW actors work patiently. Aware that they cannot defeat technologically, financially and numerically superior opponents in a conventional contest, they rely on propaganda, terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) to erode the enemy’s moral, mental and physical ability to wage war over many long years in the hopes we will lose patience or the heart to stay in the fight, or at long last be made weak enough for a conventional coup de grace.[9] These additional factors leave little doubt that we are facing 4GW opponents in Iraq and Afghanistan. What can the IC take from the military community’s debate on 4GW? 4GW actors cannot be defeated by the IC’s old cold-war posture. Retired Naval officer Larry Seaquist puts it more urgently, "Our failure to understand these new forms of war and to recognize that they are popping up all over the globe traps us in habits of inaction that feed and accelerate these armed conflicts and steadily erode our own military advantages.” [10] 4GW theory argues that a decentralized, fast-moving, networked opponent must be defeated by a decentralized, fast-moving and networked response. There are two major challenges that the IC must overcome in addressing a 4GW enemy, and the lessons for the IC of the Wilson, Wilcox and Richards presentation are clear. They are rather heavy-handedly summed up by Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) expert Robert David Steele, “Since World War II, an otherwise clever nation has fallen prey to several erroneous premises, among them that intelligence demands secrecy; that technology is a fine substitute for thinking. . .” [11] 1.) Dissemination of information in the IC is hierarchical and compartmented. Dissemination of information among 4GW actors is networked and unhindered by artificial policy constraints and information sharing barriers. This allows 4GW opponents to work inside the IC’s OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act)[12] decision loop and outpace the IC’s own collection, analysis, dissemination of and action on, intelligence. 2.) The IC, like the DOD in JV 2020, relies far too heavily on high technology solutions. New and more complex databases, analysis applications and an ever proliferating number and variety of computer networks serves only to hinder its efforts, either by overwhelming it with collected information that cannot be analyzed effectively or expending valuable resources that could be put towards low-tech solutions that 4GW theory suggests would be more effective (such as language skills, cultural awareness of the enemy and additional staff in the field). Steele again vehemently attacks the confluence of the IC’s two greatest weaknesses: obsession with hierarchy and information compartmentalization and overdependence on high technology; “We are wasting today at least $10 billion a year on secret technical intelligence collection systems whose fruits cannot be harvested, and we are about to waste $60 billion over ten years recapitalizing these same secret technical collection systems, so that we might collect 100 times more information, and process still less of it. Analysts, analytic tools, and access to open sources of information comprise the "collateral damage" of the secret war and its obsession with compartmentation.” [13] Our 4GW opponents are far less limited by hierarchical patterns of information dissemination, and not subject to a classification compartmentalization system or a large bureaucracy. They make use of technology in a fast and effective manner, while still managing to operate inside the IC’s OODA loop and advancing their aims with low-technology solutions, such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that are often made out of parts a child could buy at Radio Shack. Wilson, Wilcox and Richards’ presentation shows us what troops on the ground in Iraq are learning in real-time: To defeat the enemy, we must think and operate like the enemy. Using Networked Information Technology (IT) Systems as a model Ironically, the best example of the IC’s failure to work in a low-tech, networked manner is evident in its implementation of its high technology solutions: the computer networks on which it relies every day. The low-tech 4GW actor simply relies on “the existing networks created by the information-based economy. These networks provide a cheap, robust, redundant system and allows the information to blend into the trillions of legitimate transaction that take place every day.”[14] By using the existing technologies of email, the internet and instant-messaging, insurgents and terrorists can communicate seamlessly and in real-time, largely unhampered by a risk-adverse need for bureaucratic approval from a top-down hierarchical structure. There’s no limitation imposed by classification compartments or inter-agency miscommunications. Intelligence and better yet, actionable information that is not yet finished intelligence, travels in real-time, allowing the 4GW actor to operate inside the IC’s OODA loop. In contrast, the IC, like the rest of the federal government follows the commercial model for designing and operating its networks[15], while it battles the largest reorganization in its history. The result is the IC’s operating on a variety of disparate computer networks that can barely communicate. Various versions of email applications, operating systems and analysis applications are approved for use at varying agencies with little to no coordination with one another. The result is that frequently information cannot flow between the CIA, the FBI, CIFA, NSA and various other agencies with the speed needed because of something as basic as sheer mass of technological incompatibility. The solution the IC has attempted to implement has been more technology expenditure. "Success is dependent on networked information technology systems and the capacity to manage and share information effectively. . .”[16] said FBI Director Robert Mueller, and yet the FBI’s highly publicized 170 million dollar investment in its Virtual Case File (VCF) system has resulted in little to no advantage for either the FBI or the IC at large[17] . Meanwhile, the FBI’s Executive Assistant Director was quoted as arguing against the need for expertise in counterterrorism, geo-political skills, or Arabic language training. "You need leadership. You don't need subject matter expertise," Garry Bald testified in an ongoing FBI employment case. "It is certainly not what I look for in selecting an official for a position in a counterterrorism position.”[18] 4GW theory argues strenuously against such thinking, and holds up the failure of multi-million dollar investments such as VCF to produce real gains in the war on terror. As the insurgents make use of easily networked commercially available systems (we would do well to recall how Somali fighters outstripped communications of the legendary Delta Force with something as simple and commercially available as a public cellular phone network)[19] and otherwise rely on low-technology systems such as IEDs and suicide bombings, they continue to move one step ahead of us. We must always remain cognizant of the fact that 4GW is ultimately about message and political will. Sophisticated computers and complex databases cannot get our message out nor change the political will of the enemy or the population who supports him. Analysts and agents who speak Arabic, and are culturally and geo-politically literate in the Arab, Persian and Turkish worlds can. We must remember the critical points made in the Wilson, Wilcox and Richards presentation already quoted in the introduction as well as one more: Defeat a networked threat with a network, or as the presenters cite John Boyd, “We should be the ones in the village, not the people attacking the village.[20] ” Insurgents and terrorist 4GW actors are not hampered by the risk-adverse, hierarchical nature of the IC’s bureaucracy. This allows them to move intelligence and act on it more quickly. The classification system, and the compartmented nature of classification, is, to put it mildly, dauntingly complex. Worse, there is no coordination across agencies, resulting in situations such as ICE and FBI agents not getting critical information needed to act on domestic 4GW threats because they lack sufficient clearance, or an inability to make use of the information anyway because its classification level or compartment would make it unactionable at a law-enforcement level. The constant need to wait for approval from the top down slows the process further. 4GW actors function in a decentralized manner, with each foot soldier having a clear understanding of a strategic goal, and being able to move towards it with little direction from above, quickly and efficiently. They don't have to worry about being unable to use certain critical pieces of information because they aren't cleared, nor do they have to wait for permission from a unit chief to take action. They can just put down their broom, pick up a gun, call themselves an Al-Qa’ida cell, and boom, they are. The hierarchical nature of the IC bureaucracy creates a false distinction in division of labor that prevents the kind of mixing of skills that creates a fluid network necessary to combat a 4GW opponent. Here again, the standard IT infrastructure of federal government organizations provides a good example: Across the government, IT systems are designed, implemented and documented by engineers, who then hand completed systems over to administrators/operations staff who maintain and run them day to day. This is a false distinction created by the need to establish hierarchy. Engineering positions are believed to be a “rung up” from administration (although the skills required are near identical). This is silly on its face. Who better understands the day to day idiosyncrasies and bugs that will be encountered in a system than the person who designed it? Who better to run it day to day? And who better to design and implement new systems than the people who maintain them each day and have a boots on the ground understanding of the requirements of the customer? The division is both false and impractical. Likewise, an analyst or desk officer sits in an air-conditioned office working on link analysis charts or poring over reams of data, while the agent/operator collects in the field. The analysts are stymied by their inability to do even rote investigation on location, and the operators are lacking critical information they may not be getting from analysts based on hierarchical interoffice/agency restrictions and classification compartmental restrictions. Even when the information does eventually flow, it may be too late by the time it gets to those who need it. The distinction is, as in the above example, false and unnecessary. Wilson, Wilcox and Richards sum it up best when they say “Put our intelligence analysts on patrol with the squads, platoons, and companies.[21] ” To the extent that it practically can, the line between analyst and agent/operator must be blurred to produce the kind of lateral network we need to move efficiently against a 4GW enemy. Conclusion The discussion of 4GW in the military has many lessons for the IC. By paying attention to how the military is thinking about and responding to 4GW opponents, the IC at large can honestly assess the enemy we are facing today and move to combat him most effectively. Among the chief lessons for the IC of 4GW theory are: 1.) The enemy operates in a loose network, sharing information across disparate cultural, linguistic and political groups to achieve his aim. The IC must respond in kind, operating in a loose network that shares information quickly across manifold agencies, departments and IT systems in real-time. 2.) 4GW actors operate in decentralized fashion, moving, planning and acting in small cells. To defeat him, so must we, letting go of our present obsession with centralized hierarchy and disseminating command and control functions more widely. Operators in the field must have the capacity to make decisions and move on them in real time, without having to worry about the consequences of stepping outside hierarchical, bureaucratic boundaries. The IC must disseminate action to small task-forces that operate in cellular fashion. 3.) The present classification system with its various compartments is an obstacle to the timely flow of information. It must be reexamined with an eye on making it simpler and quicker to navigate. Where information can be declassified, it should be. In many cases, unprocessed information may be more valuable than processed intelligence. Strict adherence to the intelligence cycle[22] may not always be in the IC’s best interest and slows down our OODA loop relative to our 4GW opponents. 4.) The IC’s interest in high-technology information management solutions as the ultimate weapon in the war on terror is misplaced. 4GW is ultimately low-tech. We must invest in people, rather than technology. Language skills as well as geo-political and cultural skills are cheaper to procure and provide more lasting benefits than computer systems. The money saved can be invested in additional “boots on the ground” that are critical to winning a low-tech 4GW conflict. 5.) The IC must eliminate false distinctions in division of labor. It must give individual agents the ability to act at all levels of the intelligence cycle, merging the functions of analysts, desk officers and agents/operators in the field. 6.) Patience. 4GW conflicts take far longer than past modern wars. Mao Tse-Tung took over twenty years to complete his conquest of China. The Communist victory in Indochina took even longer. Many argue that we’ve been involved in a 4GW struggle against Salafist extremists since 1979 [23] . The IC should adjust its strategy to reflect long term strategic goals. By incorporating these important lessons from 4GW theory, the IC can begin to close the gap the insurgents and terrorists presently have opened on us in Iraq and Afghanistan. It can see this conflict for what it is and focus on what is necessary for victory: not the capture and death of the enemy, but the subjugation of his will to carry on the contest. [1] 4GW and OODA Loop Implications of the Iraqi Insurgency presented at the Panel on Conceptual Frontiers by COL G.I. Wilson (USMC), LTC (ret.) Greg Wilcox, USA and COL (ret.) Chet Richards, USAF. Apr. 2004. [2] JV2020 is published by the JCS and can be downloaded for free from dtic.mil. [3] Wilson, Wilcox and Richards. 4GW and OODA Loop Implications of the Iraqi Insurgency. [4] For more on the life and work of John Boyd, see Franklin C. Spinney. Genghis John. Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute. Jul. 1997. pp.42-47. [5] Armed Forces Journal, Nov. 2004 [6] William S. Lind, COL Keith Nightengale, USA, CAPT John F. Schmitt, USMC and LTC Gary I. Wilson. The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation. Marine Corps Gazette. Oct. 1989. pp. 22-26. [7] For a comprehensive look at the nature of 4GW actors, see COL(ret.) Thomas X. Hammes, USMC. The Sling and The Stone. On War in the 21st Century. Zenith Press, St. Paul. 2004. [8] Mao Tse-Tung. On Protracted War. People’s Publishing House, Peking; 1954. [9] For an in-depth discussion of “changing the correlation of forces” to favor a traditionally outclassed insurgent body, see Mao Tse-Tung. Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare). US Naval War College. 1937. [10] Larry Seaquist. Community War. Proceedings of The U.S. Naval Institute. Aug. 2000. [11] Robert David Steele. The New Craft of Intelligence. OSS.Net. Jul. 2001. [12] COL (ret.) John Boyd, USAF. Patterns of Conflict. Dec. 1986. This briefing was never formally published. A copy can be obtained from d-n-i.net. [13] Steele. The New Craft of Intelligence. [14] COL(ret.) Thomas X. Hammes, USMC. The Sling and The Stone. On War in the 21st Century. Zenith Press, St. Paul. 2004. pp. 197. [15] For more on commercial standards of best practice in network design by the industry’s leader, see Microsoft’s patterns and practices Center: Architecture and Design Guides at http://msdn.microsoft.com/practices/ArchDes/default.aspx. [16] Sarah Lai Stirland. Justice Budget Focused On Using Info To Combat Terrorism. National Journal’s Technology Daily – PM Edition. May 2005. [17] Terry Frieden. FBI wasted millions on 'Virtual Case File'. CNN. Feb. 2005. [18] John Solomon. FBI Failed to Hire Mideast Terror Experts. Associated Press. Jun. 2005. [19] Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down. Penguin Books, New York. Mar. 2000. [20] Wilson, Wilcox and Richards. 4GW and OODA Loop Implications of the Iraqi Insurgency. [21] Ibid. [22] For more on the Intelligence Cycle and how it works, please see The CIA FactBook On Intelligence, available at odci.gov. [23] 1979 marks many significant events, among them the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Soviet entry into Afghanistan and the Salafist seizure of the Grand Mosque in Makkah.